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ITHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUL THEORY
Beginning with Anaxagoras down to the present day the
problem of mind or consciousness has remained one of the central
topics of philosophical discussion. No philosophical subject has
received so much attention, and no philosophical subject has been
so hotly contested as the problem of intelligence. That this is
so can be seen from the enormous literature and from the fact that
at present the study of consciousness can boast of being a special
science, the science of psychology. One of the reasons why the
subject secured so much attention is not only because it is itself
an important field for philosophical study, but also because any
definite stand upon this subject will affect one's entire philos-
ophical outlook. However the case may be, there are a number of
theories in which an attempt has been made to explain the nature
and meaning of consciousness, There is the soul theory, which con-
siders consciousness as due to some particular spiritual substance,
while there is another extreme that would consider consciousness as
a form of mechanism. Again there is the view that the soul con-
sists of the unity of psychic life; while still another view, which
is held by the pragmati3ts and which we are attempting to defend
in this thesis, maintains that consciousness is a certain kind of
relation. As to what kind of relation this is and as to how far
our theory is justified in contrast with other theories, we shall
discuss as we go along.
Perhaps the most significant fact about man, as contrasted
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with his environment, is the fact that man is a highly conscious
being. Of course there are other beings beside man, from a mon-
key to a fish, which seem to possess a varying degree of intelli-
gence or consciousness, but none of these seem equal in that re-
spect to man. Of our own consciousness we seem to have no doubt.
We simply say we know things and this is a fact. The only question
left is what does "to know" mean as distinguished from not knowing.
Of other beings we speak as conscious because they seem to behave
in a way which is characteristic of ourselves when we say "we
know", that is they perform acts that can be classified as consci-
ous acts. We sometimes even speak of a puppet as if it were con-
scious. This "as if it were" is important, for by thi3 we seem to
indicate that although there is some similarity between the puppet
and a conscious being, yet there exists at the same time an essen-
tial difference between the behavior of the two which is all the
difference in the world between consciousness and non-consciousness
What then is this difference?
That there is a difference between conscious and non-con-
scious behavior is easily confirmed by experience. If we throw a
ball into the fire, the changes that take place in the burning ball
can be explained by mechanical and chemical processes. First there
entered the energy of heat which separated some particles of the
ball, then a chemical reaction took place which ended in the burn-
ing up of the ball, and this of course was neither a pleasant nor
unpleasant consummation. The burning ball seemed to be indifferent
to its fate. In fact it did not behave in a way which showed
signs that it was conscious of its being burned. You can put the

3ball in the fire only for a moment, tak9 it out and then throw it
in again to complete the process of burning. Each particular step
in the process is determined by conditions already existing. That
is to say, each antecedent is followed by a certain consequent
without any reference to the welfare of the ball. With regard to
ourselves, when we come in contact with the fire, not only do the
mechanical and chemical processes take place, but we say the fire
is hot, - "it is hot, it is painfull" Well, what on earth is
that? HotI painfull - not only do there seem to be mechanical and
chemical processes, but something seems to be added to them. More
over after we are once burned by the fire we are likely to keep
away from it at a safe distance; that is, we know that it is hot,
that it is painful, without the same mechanical and chemical pro-
cesses occurring again. How are we to account for all this?
The "man on the street" if he were asked concerning the
difference between himself and unconscious objects would probably
reply - the soul! He has a soul, while those non-conscious ob-
jects have no souls, and not only that, but often he would assert
that only men have a soul, while other animals, although conscious
yet have no souls, which alone is sufficient to account for the
particular brand of intelligence which is peculiarly human. The
latter, however, may only be a local opinion depending largely
upon a certain type of religious training. Thus there are some
who attribute to other animals a spiritual entity, yet explain
the distinction between man and the lower animals by saying that
man has a divine soul while the animal has a kind of "unclean
spirit", a sort of minor devil. Others even go so far as to make
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stance - and heathen may sometimes mean all those who do not "belong
to a particular church - have only an animal soul, which, however,
can be transformed into a divine soul by baptism or other religio-
mechanical means. How this soul brings about conscious behavior,
how it controls muscular activity, is a question to which many
vague answers have been given. Nevertheless there have been current
very definite opinions as to the nature of the stuff of which the
soul is composed, which stuff largely varied with the degree of
culture that had been attained. The idea that the soul is a spir-
itual non-spacial substance was by no means the first step in the
soul theory. It takes a great deal of ingenuity and perhaps some
amount of sophistication to make any distinction between the spir-
itual and the material at all. The early Hebrews, for instance,
called the soul "flVl", which is synonymous with breath, or wind, or
air, while the Greeks called it n VinJ^cc n which means breath, or
"VlotfJ", which was supposed to be a kind of fiery ether, - a quasi-
material holy breath. There was of course some reason for these
suppositions. They looked for the cause of conscious behavior.
There was, however, no particular material part of the body which
ceased to be when conscious life stopped operating. There was not
anything as a part of the body that one could lay one's finger on
and say that if this is present consciousness is also present, while
when it is absent consciousness is also absent. In the case of the
breath it was different. When a body ceased to be conscious, when
it died, the breath was no longer there, it had departed. Ergo,
the cause of consciousness must then be the breath. A closer ex-
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ities. Air was air, fire was fire and nothing more, that is, out-
side the conscious organism. These substances showed no traces of
consciousness and did not differ in this respect from other material
bodies. True, air and fiery ether are, so to speak, very thin forms
of matter, so thin as to suggest pure thought, nevertheless there
was no reason why a gaseous vertebrate should perform greater won-
ders than a solid vertebrate. If matter was to explain conscious
phenomena, one form of matter was as good as another, unless partic -
ular circumstances are taken into consideration. But people are
not likely to scrutinize circumstances carefully when such a factor
as consciousness and the possibilities of immortality are involved,
especially when the circumstances are inadequate to proving notions
which for biological reasons there is a tendency to establish with-
out proof. They wish to know "who is the king behind the door of
consciousness", and what is most important, they want him to be
there. Verily it is the immortal homunculus who pulls the strings
of the nervous system and makes the mortal body behave in a consci-
ous manner.
One who is not disposed to swallow the entire theory at one
gulp is likely to stop at this point, because of what under ordin-
ary circumstances would be considered, to say the least, as an im-
portant detail, namely, what is the empirical evidence for this
soul theory?
To this question the adherents of the soul theory reply
that the soul is not a material object; it is spiritual - and by
spiritual is meant here a non-spacial, simple, indivisible, trans-

6cendsntal coul substance. The soul therefore is not a thing to be
seen, heard, touched, et c
.
, neverthele ss it is there, although the
term "there" could not mean there in space.
In order to see what this soul substance means and whether
it solves the problem of consciousness we will have to enter in
some detail into the subject of substance for the purpose of dis-
cussing what is meant by that term and whether it is a term that
can be applied to the soul. It seems, however, that these very
negative qualities of xhe soul are the things which its adherents
deem to be of the highest advantage, since these negative quali-
ties are the "raison d'etre" of the immortality of the soul.
* * * *

II
SUBSTANCE AND SOUL -SUB STANCE
Perhaps the test way to determine the validity and possi-
bilities of the theory of soul- sub stance is to inquire into the
nature of substance in general,, from whence the concept of a soul-
substance has been derived by analogy.
What is a substance? There is the common-sense and the
metaphysical view of substance. To the common-sense view any object
having some permanence in space, without any further reference, that
is, the object as it is experienced, if it has permanence in space,
is a substance. Thus a shadow is not a substance. The shadow is
not only relative to position but can disappear out of space alto-
gether. For the same reason, the common senss view looks upon a
solid as being more substantiality than, let us say, a liquid; and
a gas, a vapor, or a sublimate seem to be semi- sub stantial . A
cloud of smoke is thus only a "mere smoke", because the particles
of the smoke on separation give the impression that the substance
had not only changed its position in space, cut that it disappeared
entirely. A solid, on the other hand, does not ordinarily vanish
by mere change of position. You can hear then in ordinary lan-
guage "solid", "substantial", "concrete", etc., used as synonymous
terms. Of course it all depends on the amount of scientific train-
ing one has had. To the chemist, for instance, a gas is just as
much of a substance as a solid. What is significant for our dis-
cussion is that to the common-sense view substance is experiential,
that those qualities of the object given in experience are the very
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substance is something more than the mere experiential qualities
of the object. In fact the substance as such may not be experienced
at all. The substance is the hypothetical something which subsists
by itself or which supports the qualities which we do experience.
The question is, have we any reason to believe in the metaphysical
notion of substance?
It happens sometimes that we speak of a thing as having
existence although .it is not present to experience, because it helps
us to explain certain things which are given in experience. It is a
necessary postulate, a necessary hypothesis. Thus some physicists
postulate an universal ether because it helps to explain the phe-
nomenon of light. Well, as far as necessary hypotheses go there
is no need for a metaphysical substance inherent in the object
which is other than the qualities given in experience. The idea
of an abstract substance originated in two ways, one of which is
the double-approach method of referring to an experience - the
"that" and the "what" of a thing. Any one who has a limited vo-
cabulary when asked for a further explanation of the meaning of an
experienced object will usually refer to the "thatness" of the ob-
ject, that is, he will refer to the fact of experience in order to
convey the meaning. For example, if a foreigner who knows very
little English, but who knows to call a knife by its proper name,
be asked to state what is meant by a knife and finds himself unable
to give any definition in English he would be likely to point with
his forefinger to a knife - "thatl - that is a knife!" In this
manner he tells us that this fact of experience means to us what

9it meant to him., that is in certain situations we will adjust our-
selves to it or "by means of it in a particular way. One, however,
who has an extensive English vocabulary may go over directly to
the meansing of the object and say, "a knife is something to cut
with"; that is, he will explain the meaning of an object in terms
of behavior. The distinction between the "that" and the "what"
is a functional, not an ontological distinction. The difference
is a difference in our mode of approach, depending largely upon the
given situation where the "that" plays the role of a possible ad-
justment taken for granted - a fact, while the "what" plays the
role of a possible adjustment not yet taken for granted, but which
will have to be considered as a particular kind of adjustment when
it enters experience - "it means so and so ...". The difference
then lies not in the qualities of the object, but in our attitude
of cognition and verification of the qualities. Metaphysicians
however separated the functional distinction of the "that" and the
"what", of the fact and the meaning, as if they were distinctions
of kind. There appeared the illusion that after it has been told
what a thing is, something else is left unsaid which is the "that"
of a thing. But as soon as you begin to say the least thing
about it you somehow fall back on its meaning; that is, you must
describe it in terms of behavior. In other words, as soon as you
say that a thing "is", if this thing is to have any reality you
must tell what it does. A real "is" always involves a "does", and
this may perhaps throw light on our whole theory of consciousness,
we shall therefore discuss it later on, but what is here important,
is to see that if you separate fact from meaning you get a self-
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subsisting substance, - or essence the only attribute of which is
existence and, if strained a great deal, al30 causality. This sep-
aration, however, is psychologically impossible, since existence by
itself without meaning cannot be distinguished from non-existence.
Psychologically the idea, or rather the illusion, of sub-
stance comes through the experience of touch, and change in the
qualities of the object. When we touch an object there is a ten-
dency on our part to break through to the "inside" or "core" of the
object which blocks our movements. This inside appears to be mys-
terious. This tendency is especially noticeable in children who
break open their toys to find out what is inside. We are always
inclined to hunt for an imaginary "core" or "heart" of the thing.
Again when we notice the coming and going qualities there is the
temptation to make a comparison with the animate world and consider
the coming and going of qualities as so many appearances, as dresses
which the objects assume. "The earth", is thus "dressed in green
verdure". The first explanation of change was therefore animism.
Later on we cams to see the important part environment plays in
change. Animism was given up, but the object still retained its
identity as something not depending upon its qualities. There re-
mained an indefinable something - a substance which supported the
qualities. When this abstraction had to be explained, it was found
that it could not be done without referring to these very qualities
which were supposed to be mere appearances. In either case the
idea of substance appeared because of the lack of critical examina-
tion of the object. In the case of separation of fact and meaning
the idea of substance is founded in shallow rationalism, while the
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psychological illusion of substance is founded in a crude empiri-
cism.
The idea of soul- sub stanc e came into existence by an anal-
ogy from substance in general. If qualities come and go and there
is still left a substance which subsists by itself, so also mental
qualities come and go leaving a residue of ment al- 3ub stanc e . The
characteristic of mental qualities and ideas is that they are non-
spacial, therefore the soul-substance is non-spacial. From the
fact that the soul undergoes no change, another negative soul at-
tribute may be derived, namely, that it is non- temporal . If the
soul does not change, it means that it receives no impression of
change, that it is not affected by anything external. Time there-
fore i3 an indifferent matter to it; it is beyong time, it is eter-
nal in a metaphysical sense and thus gains immortality. The ad-
vantage of this kind of immortality is not very evident. The im-
mortality of a spaceless and timeless soul means a mathematical
moment of blessed nothingness - which is a very dull and monotonous
prospect. All this, however, depends upon private taste if it
could only in some way explain the meaning of consciousness, and
thi3 is the very thing which the 30ul theory cannot do. In the
first place, it does not explain how the soul brings about consci-
ous bodily activities. All it possibly can say, is that there is
some unknown homunculus who manipulates our actions, but what we
are interested in i3 to know the relation between this soul and
conscious behavior. In the second place, we are desirous of know-
ing what is the nature of the soul, so as to be able to establish
whether all that is ascribed to it is possible. What do we find?
n
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We find not only that so ul- sub stance does not explain conscious
behavior, but that from the very nature of the soul it follows that
such behavior, as far as human knowledge goes, is impossible. How
can a spaceless soul affect a spacial nervous system? The answer
is that this cannot be made intelligible. To be sure, the soul is
often spoken of as having certain faculties, but there is no pos-
sibility cf establishing an intelligible connection between the
soul and its faculties, nor between the faculties and conscious
responses - they all remain detached. Faculties there ought to
be, somehow, somewhere; while the soul as an eternal, immaterial
substance is somehow nowhere. The soul is thus not only an un-
necessary postulate but a confusing one. The law of parsimony is
therefore not the only reason why the soul theory as an explana-
tion of consciousness should be ruled out.

Ill
CONSCIOUSNESS AS A THING- AND AS A RELATION
The failure to explain intelligent behavior on the ba3i3
of soul- sub stance gave rise to the psychological theory of mental
states or processes as a substitute for faculty psychology. As to
the origin and nature of mental processes there exists a variety of
opinions, chief among which is that of the interac tionist 3 and the
parallel i 3 t s . According to the former, whose theory is based on
Locke's sensationalism minus the mind substance, external activi-
ties affecting the body produce such things as mertal states and
these mental states in turn control muscular activity. This view
seems to be simple enough except for its difficulties, which dif-
ficulties could not be removed except on condition of refraining
from asking any further questions. In other words, the simplicity
of interac tionism is not due to its profundity but to its naivete.
To the uncritical mind nothing is more convincing than that which
is dressed up in a garb of causality. And, indeed, does not con-
sciousness arise when the body comes into contact with the external
world? And does not muscular activity appear in conjunction with
the phenomenon of volition? Hence one must always be the cause of
the other by reciprocity. But how do causes operate in this case?
and what is this thing called consciousness? "Here lie the re-
mains of interactionism of blessed memory".
To Degin with, mental processes are of a different stuff
from that of aaterial objects, - they are spiritual, that is, they
are not spacial. If this be so, how can a thing which does not
13
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occupy space control a spacial nervous system? How could there be
a causal relation when causation by its very definition means a
relation of and continuity with points in space? How could caus-
ation manifest itself when there is no possible spacial contact?
To say that a physiological process as a brain event can produce
such a thing as a mental state without denying the fact aht the
said physiological process is a closed circuit is something con-
trary to the law of conservation of energy. Besides having trou-
bles of its own, interactionism has no advantage over the soul
theory, since it fails to explain intelligent action. To remove
the particular difficulties of interactionism seems to be the task
of parallelism.
According to parallelism mental states are not the result
of bodity activities, nor do they control the body, but as an ac-
companiment to every nervous activity there is a simultaneous men-
tal process, - a spaceless shadow trailing along the path of in-
nocent determinism. Ana this is intelligence J It is evident that
parallelism instead of removing the difficulties of interactionism
is like any other theory which starts with fundamental fallacies -
the further it explains the more it leaves to explain - to explain
its very explanations. In the end the explanations of parallelism
bring us back to our original problem: What is intelligent behav-
ior and how is it possible? If our mental states have nothing to
do with our bodily activities, then the body is only a complex
mechanism, which leaves no room for intelligent activity, no room
for profit from experience and consequently no room for control
of environment, without which it would be impossible ever to argue
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in favor of the theory of parallelism. Why does an organism whose
activities can be explained in its own terms need mental states?
Does it exist merely in order that psychologists may have a sub-
ject matter for study?
Outside of the particular difficulties which beset the
respective paths of int erac tionism and parallelism there are some
difficulties which all species of "mental state" psychologies have
in common. In the first place, what is it that gives unity to the
mental states? In the second place, if all that we can possibly
know are these very mental states, what right have we then to
speak of a world existing outside of these mental states?
Suppose then that we rssurvey our original material and
see what other possible solution of the problem it might offer.
Our given material is a body and its environment. So far nothing
else is given, ana it is only when there is an interaction between
the two, and an interaction of a specific nature, that we detect
what we call intelligence. Intelligence, then, so far as we can
infer from the given material, is a relation between the body and
its environment. We detect it by the particular way in which the
body behaves toward its environment. Our problem then is to de-
termine what kind of behavior this is.
A chemist describing the characteristics of an acid in
its relation to a metal is apt to say that the acid behaves in
such a way a3 to form metallic oxide, or the metal behaves toward
the acid so as to generate hydrogen. To economize language the
chemist often speaks of the strength of the acid or of the solu-
bility of the salt, etc. This however is merely economy of lan-
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guage. The chemist does not intend here to hypostasize the strength
of the acid by considering it as a thing that can be separated from
the acid in contact with some other object; as something which ia
inherent in the acid possessing causal capacities with regard to
an acid-metal reaction or acid-salt solution. No J It is only a
shorthand way of describing the chemical relation between the acid
and some other substances; it is a description of a situation be-
tween two objects and can be described arbitrarily in terms of one
as well as the other. The same analysis applied to consciousness
gives us a clue to the fallacy of traditional psychology. The fal-
lacy consists in the hypostatization of consciousness, in consider-
ing consciousness as a species of th^ghooi with causal capacities
other than the situation created by a body and its environment; by
considering it as a third external factor which entered voluntarily
from an unknown region. To speak of consciousness as a thing by
itself is the same as speaking of the strength or acidity of an
acid as things by themselves. what we have in a conscious situa-
tion is not three things - a body, consciousness and environment,
but two things, - a body and its environment - consciousness being
the name for a relation between the two. In order to explain the
meaning of consciousness we must find out the type of relation ex-
isting between an organism ana its environment, when a situation is
said to be conscious. What kind of behavior is intelligent be-
havior as distinct from mechanical action, when we start with the
preposition that two and only two things enter into relation?
Suppose that we take a mechanical object such as a puppet
of a Punch and Judy play; we pull the strings and the puppet moves

17
its arms and legs. Now if by pulling the strings one of its arms
happens to come into contact with fire and is somewhat turned^ we can
still continue to pull the strings and the puppet would manifest no
objection to being burned again. The puppet has not learned any-
thing from experience, nor does it seem to care for the future.
This is where the difference appears in intelligent or conscious
behavior. If a child burns its hand it learns from experience
and behaves with reference to the future - to the future of either
being or not being burned. The fire acquires a meaning for the
child. It is conscious of the fire, because it reads off in it
something wnich the puppet did not; it reads off in the fire the
fact that it will burn. The child need not put its hand into the
fire for a second time and withdraw after actually being burned,
but sees the possibilities of the fire and behaves accordingly.
To behave with regard to the possibilities of the fire is
what seeing means; to see the fire is to see that it will burn.
Conscious behavior is the ability to control the body with referenci
to the future; it is control of the body by a purpose, and the pur-
pose may be construed in terns of biological adjustment. What we
can say so far is that consciousness is a purposive relation. Our
task now will be to examine this relation a little more in detail.

IV
INTELLIGENCE AND BEHAVIOR
In the preceding chapter we insisted that intelligence is
a relation between an organism and its environment, just as the
strength of an acid is a relation between the acid and a metal or
a salt with which it comes into contact. From this it would follow
that intelligence is not a thing or entity in a causal sense,, which
determines the relation between the organism and its environment,
but that the very relation itself, because of its peculiar charac-
ter, is called intelligence. By this we also mean to imply that,
although consciousness is a name for a relation, the same as the
strength of an acid is a name for a relation, yet there are rela-
tions and relations, and that intelligence is a relation of a pe-
culiar kind. This peculiarity, as we have previously mentioned,
consists in the fact that intelligence is a relation of control, -
a type of behavior where an object or objects of the environment
control with reference, not to what is actually happening at the
moment, and at that particular moment affecting the body, but with
reference to what will or may happen in the future. To put it in
other words, intelligence is the ability to telescope, the ability
to transfer the future into the present; not to actually experience
the future by a mechanical impact as in the case of the acid and
the metal, out to foresee what would happen if that mechanical im-
pact were to take place. Intelligence is not, as Kant would have
us assume, a case where the tran scendentally ideal becomes empiri-
cally real. It is not a situation embodying a strange static mix-
ture of mechaniem with a foreign transcendental element where.
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through the medium of purely abstract and therefore inconceivable
temporal schemas, are transformed the still more abstract and there-*
fore still more inconceivable non-temporal idealities. Intelligence
or consciousness, as will be borne out by physiological evidence,
is a purely active, dynamic relation where the teleologically ideal
becomes empirically real. An act can be called intelligent when
the body behaves with reference to a purpose or end.
How it seems that so much every one will admit, namely,
that if a being can foresee events, if it can avoid dangers or at-
tain definite purposes, it deserves to be called an intelligent
body. As a matter of fact, this generally serves as a criterion
to test intelligence. This however is not the whole story. Al-
though all seem to agree to the quality of an act that may be cha-
racterized as intelligent, yet not all will admit that intelligence
is constituted by that act as it is. There seem to be two extremes
of opinion in regard to this matter, both of which try to find be-
hind the purposive act something else. On the one hand there are
the mechanists who maintain that although an intelligent act ap-
pears to be purposive, yet that this is only apparently so; that
after all the conscious act can be reduced to a simpler explana-
tion of mere push and pull - to mechanism. On the other hand there
are the transcendentalist s who maintain that there is something
behind the entire situation, that is, not only behind the act, but
behind the actor and the environment as well which makes intelli-
gence possible. These theories would deserve some separate dis-
cussion if our object were simply to deal with the proof or dis-
proof of either of these theories. Since, however, our object is
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a particular thesis, we shall have done sufficient justice to any
theory if our own explanations of consciousness will imply a pos-
sible refutation of any other hypothesis.
To proceed then: If consciousness is a relation we must
find out what happens to the things related; what happens to the
organism and to the object of its environment which makes this
relation possible, keeps it in this related state and develops it.
We must also find out whether under the given condition the mater-
ial could not function in the same manner without constituting this
typical relation. The question here is, what services this type
of relation performs that could not be performed otherwise. Since
we are dealing here with living organisms, the question becomes
highly imperative: "What is the biological use, what is the biolog-
ical need that this type of relation supplies?"
Suppose then that we turn to physiological facts. We
find an organism endowed with what we call the capacity for reflex
movements. These reflex movements are mechanical, mere push and
pull, so to speak. Given a certain stimulus antecedent in time,
a certain consequent will follow. No one is conscious of his own
reflex movement; no one is conscious of the circulation of his
blood, of digestion and other reflex movements, unless something
happens to the machinery or unless, for some reason, he makes an
effort to examine them, in which case there is some need to be
satisfied. What then happens to the nervous system that it could
not by the same reflex movements adapt itself to its environment?
One may ask, of course, whether nature could not create a nervous
machinery which by mere reflex movements would be able to adapt
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itself to all possible situations. The answer to this question I
shall leave to those who find it profitable to instruct nature in
their own particular economy. We shall meanwhile see why a given
nervous system could not adapt itself of purely reflex movements
by referring to what actually happens.
If we compare beings of a lower with those of a higher
degree of intelligence, we find that among the former the entire
neural apparatus is more or less fixed, rigid and determinate.
That is, an incoming nerve current will result practically in the
same responses every time, since it does not affect to any great
extent the other neural centers. In the proper environment an
animal of this kind can thrive without much conscious effort. Na-
ture in the process of evolution has endowed it with a nervous sys-
tem fit to respond and to survive in that environment. There is a
continuity of interaction between the organism and its environment
which makes for the survival of a given species. The animal does
not have to do much learning; it "knows" what to do at the start.
These capacities of the animal are inherited. These inherited ad-
vantages, however, cease to be such as soon as the animal is taken
out of its environment. When the environment is of such a nature
as to offer different stimuli and consequently demanding respec-
tively different responses, for which the animal has either no ca-
pacities at all, or the responses are of such a rigid nature as to
be always the same to all sorts of stimuli, so that adjustment is
impossible or at all events difficult, and the chances for survival
are consequently small. In the case of a more intelligent animal,
let us say a human being, the nervous system is much more compli-
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cated, flexible, and indeterminate. Both the animals of a higher
and a lower degree of intelligence are born with inherited motor
apparatuses. In the case of the higher animals the nervous system
is so organized as to allow for a greater variation of responses,
since it possesses the capacity for combining in a variety of ways
different responses and also because the sense organs are of such
a nature as to furnish the organism with a greater variety of stim-
uli. This greater complexity of organization is precisely the caus
why the organism could not be biologically efficient if it were
to work purely on the principles of mechanics. In the first place
the same motor apparatus may be controlled by different stimuli,
as in the case of eye movements, which may be controlled both by
visual and auditory stimuli; or one stimulus may set off more than
one apparatus, since any muscular movement may be effected by some
nervous center other than the cerebral cortex, so that more than
one response will tend to occur in connection with a single stim-
ulus. There appears then the possibility for a conflict and block-
ing of the responses. It is precisely out of such conflict of in-
compatible responses that consciousness arises. Mechanism, so to
speak, did all it could, but it ended in a dead lock. In order
that the organism should survive, a reorganization of responses is
necessary, ana this reorganization of responses is that which makes
the stimulus a different one from what it was before the reorgani-
zation. Thus the fire may set off a movement to reach for it, but
at the same time, owing to the impression left on the nervous sys-
tem on a previous occasion, it sets off the response for withdraw-
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al. In order that the organism should survive, the stimulus must
be transformed so that the organism can escape from the maladapta-
tion caused b y a tangle of conflicting responses. The fire becomes
a stimulus which reveals its potentialities without testing them,
and this, on the other hand, is possible only because the responses
have "been so organized that the last movement of the first experi-
ence appears as the first and direct response to the stimulus. We
then become conscious of the fire as being hot, namely, we behave
towards the fire as if it burned us at this particular moment, al-
though at this particular moment we do not have the experience of
I a burn. The experience we do have at this moment is of a "will
burn". What is true of this case is true of all others. Thus we
keep our eyes half closed when we look at the sun, tend to move our
jaws when something appetizing is presented to us, although we are
not as yet chewing the food. In all these cases the stimulus pro-
vides its own response and may even strengthen it, while the re-
sponse keeps on bringing into clearer outline the stimulus. If we
do not keep on looking at the fire, that is, if the stimulus does
not control us any longer, we do not see it any more. The future
result of the stimulus must keep on controlling us in order that
a definite response may follow. On the other hand, the response
did appear directly to a fire as being hot, but began with a re-
sponse to a different stimulus and only as a consequence or the re-
organization of responses; as a result of modification of the ner-
vous system, does the fire appear as hot. The tendency to respond
to the first stimulus is still present, but the "futurity" of the
object prevents it from being carried out and therefore goes over
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into a modified response, namely a response to what wil
j
.
happen.
This response to future possibilities is precisely what we call
cognition.
From what has been said up to now it would seem impossible
for experience to get a start, for if experience means to be able
to foresee future consequences, how could we foresee future conse-
quences when there was no previous experience? Now the fact of
the matter is that even the first experience becomes an experience
because the organism is guided by the future. In the case of the
first experience it becomes an experience as a consequence of
blocked responses which influence and transform the stimulus. But
this transformed stimulus is called "transformed" precisely for the
reason that it can organize the blocked responses so as to carry
out a response which could not have been carried out were the stim-
ulus to remain the same in its effect as before the blocking oc-
curred. The response which follows after the organization of re-
sponses took place is therefore a conscious response, namely a
response to a stimulus which was not present before the blocking
occurred, but a stimulus which the blocked responses themselves
provided so that an effective organization of responses might be
possible. This response to a new stimulus provided by the blocked
responses for purposes of adjustment as contrasted with the re-
sponses, as far as they have been carried out up to the point where
they came into conflict, that is, to the point where they worked
automatically as a c
,
on sequence, of an object mechanically affecting
the body, is respectively the contrast between a conscious response
and a reflex movement.
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A specific example of an instinctive response will show
more clearly that the first experience is a response guided by
future consequences. A case in point is a babe reaching out in-
stinctively for a ray of light. The ray of light effects incom-
patible responses. If the result ends in reaching it means that
this response was one of those which originally brought about the
conflict. As soon as the conflict of responses occurs the stimulus
is transformed; it is a transformed stimulus, because the object,
-
a ray of light, stands now in relation to a different organism, -
to an organism with blocked responses. The blocked responses, -
i.e., the acts still suppressed, have an influence on the stimu-
lus. As a result of this influence the object becomes a stimulus
for reaching. The fact that the result was a response of reach-
ing instead of somi other response means that this response was
stronger in determining the quality of the new stimulus, that is,
before the child completed the act of reaching, this response gave
to the experience an exciting quality, or as James said, the ob-
ject as first seen is a buzzing confusion. It is an "exciting" ex-
perience because the response to reaching has not yet been com-
pleted, but at the same time this "excitement" shows the particular
kind of organization of response the new stimulus evokes in reorg-
anizing behavior; it makes the response to reacting victorious over
all the other tendencies and in this sense helps to complete it.
Moreover, the character of the new stimulus is determined with ref-
erence to biological adjustment. The response which it makes pos-
sible was already nascently present, and it is a response which,
if completed, would promote the interests of the organism. Nature
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in the process of evolution has made the child so that the influ-
ence to reach is strong and to yield to that influence is good
for the development and survival of the child. In oth9r words,
even a first conscious act is determined by future consequences or
results.
There is of course a certain distinction between instinct
and what is commonly called intelligence. But this distinction is
only a matter of degree and not of kind. A higher development of
intelligence comes into being because oi the biological insuffici-
ency of instinct. In the world of conscious behavior instinct is
an evolutionary prerequisite to higher forms of intelligence, which
means that higher intelligence is only a further development of
instinct. Both instinct and intelligence are forms of conscious-
ness, and those animals which have the highest capacities for in-
telligent behavior are precisely the ones that show the least ca-
pacity for adaptive behavior at their birth. A human being a
month old, if left to itself, would be helpless in comparison with
lower animals of that age. The lower animals not only possess the
capacity for reflex movements, but can also adapt themselves, with-
in a limited range, to the needs of the moment. This adaptation
is mostly performed by instinct. An instinct is however a consci-
ous affair; it is a response to a transformed stimulus, and so far
it is guided by the future. The chick pecks at the grain or at
the caterpillars because grain and caterpillars are things to be
pecked at. If, for example, cinnabar caterpillars are thrown to
the chick instead of grain, it will still keep on pecking, but -
only for a time, until it learns to discriminate. But discrimi-
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nation means that the situation at one time became probl emati c, that
an element of doubt entered into it; n is it to be pecked or not to
be pecked)' - the chick becomes for a moment a Hamlet in it own
sphere. We thus see that even lower animals show some degree of
the higher forms of consciousness, although not high enough to form
concepts. There is also the difference betwsen instinct and high-
er forms of intelligence, that the capacity for an instinctive re-
sponse is inherited. There is this direct cognition or transforma-
tion of stimulus without the element of doubt first entering into
the situation. The chick aid not learn to peck caterpillars, but
"knew" to peck from the very first moment of its birth, the same
as the babe knows to nurse at its mother's breast, but either one
can be weaned from particular modes of taking food by introducing
a situation where a modified response will be biologically neces-
sary. If this were not so; if, let us say, the chick would go on
pecking at cinnabar caterpillars, we should not be able to distin-
guish such pecking from a reflex movement. The distinction then
between animals of lower and higher intelligence consists in the
fact that among the lower animals, especially those with whom in-
stinct is in greater use as a means of survival, it takes a compar-
atively strong stimulus anu longer time to modify the instinctive
response. The degree of animal intelligence varies with the range
of modification of responses.

VTHE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION
Our problem has thus far brought us to the conclusion that
intelligence is the peculiar ability to adapt oneself to the needs
of the moment. The needs of the moment vary, and in order to be
able to adapt ourselves to a variety of situations we must possess
the capacity for a variety of responses, which means the ability
to discriminate. This ability to discriminate ranges from the cog-
nition of various objects to the formation of concepts. Our pres-
ent task is to find out the origin and development of the process
of discrimination.
That the process of discrimination starts with instinct
we have shown to some extent in the previous chapter. If we take
a specific instinctive act, such as a child reaching for a piece
of sugar and putting it in its mouth, all we can say from our point
of view in this case is that sugar is a stimulus for putting it in
the mouth, or for eating. How then do we come to discriminate
such qualities as whiteness, hardness, etc? If is only when an
object similar to sugar, and which therefore also serves as a
stimulus to putting into the mouth, but which, when put into the
mouth, becomes a different stimulus, let us say, a stimulus to
withdraw, that the process of discrimination begins. Here as in
any other case of consciousness a blocking oi responses occurs; the
whiteness and the hardness of the object are both a stimulus for
taking the object into the mouth and for withdrawing it, the re-
sult of which is a reorganization of the responses, which may end
in a closer examination of the object. After the examination of
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the object a number of things may follow. In the first place, we
begin to discriminate between sweet and some other taste. There
is the distinction between the object as a stimulus to eating and
the object as a stimulus to withdrawal. In the second place, we
begin to discriminate between white and white, hard and hard, etc.,
which may determine our behavior in the s y.me way as taste. One
white is a stimulus to eating, while another white may simply mean
that the object is not to be taken notice of at all. Simple qual-
ities are after all not so simple as they first appear to be. A
simple quality involves ascomplex a situation as any other object,
and the discrimination between simple qualities as well as between
objects involves both the process of analysis and synthesis. Red
as distinguished from other qualities may evoke a definite re-
sponse, but the discrimination of various shades of red likewise
involves a definite and specific response. A dog may evoke a
definite response as distinguished from other animals, but may also
evoke a response such as to distinguish it from other dogs; and
even the "same" dog may evoke one form of response when it is
chained and a different form of response when it is let loose,
just as the "same" shade of red may in one case mean danger, while
under different circumstances it may simply mean a necktie. As
to what the object really means is always determined by the situ-
ation; by the way we behave towards it, by the way we adjust our-
selves to it. The transformed stimulus solves the problem between
the conflicting tendencies of response; it makes a fact a particu-
lar kind of fact, it gives it a definite meaning.
The capacity on the part of a transformed stimulus to
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particularize a fact, that is, to give it a definite meaning,
throws light on our problem of fact and meaning which we have dis-
cussed in a previous chapter. In our previous discussion we have
come to the conclusion that the distinction between fact and mean-
ing is not a distinction in the kind of an object, but a distinc-
tion in the function of the situation. The fact sets the problem,
while the meaning is a name for the way the object controls us; it
is a way of telling what kind of a fact the fact is. For example:
I hear a noise; this is a fact, namely it sets a problem a3 to how
I am going to adjust myself to the noise, but in so far as I do
adjust myself, in so far as the noise controls me in a particular
way, it also has a meaning. I find that someone is rapping at the
door, and I say "that is what the noise meant". As soon, however,
as the adjustment is completed a new situation arises. The mean-
ing - the rapping at the door - tapers off into a fact and as such
it holds a new meaning. It may mean burglars or the wind or what
not, as to what kind of meaning a situation holds depends on the
kind of adjustment it demands, on the form of control. &f an ad-
justment is completed a new situation may arise and with it a new
fact and a new meaning, etc. The reason why a meaning tapers off
into a fact with a new meaning, i.e., the reason why a new situ-
ation arises, is because the new stimulus which organizes the sup-
pressed responses and thus solves the problem and completes the
adjustment, modifies our entire experience. A modified experience
means a modified stimulus and therefore a new situation and this
may go on. This also explains why, as we go along on the street.
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we often hear sounds, see colors, turn at corners, dodge street
cars, why we behave towards those things as if they had no meaning
at all, while at the same time we are conscious of the facts. The
truth of the matter is that those experiences do have a meaning
in so far as they guide us toward a certain end; they have at least
a negative meaning. If our direction is towards a green house and
we see on our way a red house, the seeing of the red house means
that it is not the house we are after, that it is something not to
be noticed. The same is true if we see a green lawn or any other
distracting object. The reason why the meaning seems to be"weak",
why we do not stop to say, "this means so and so" is because these
objects, the red, the green, the corner, the street car, as stimu-
li, have organized to such an extent the conflicting responses
from the time they have become objects of a first experience that
they can control us easily. Through constant familiarity with
these objects the nervous system has become so modified that these
objects under given situations are no more problematic; their
meaning has practically faded off into fact. We see a speeding
automobile and we dodge instinctively, as it were. The meaning
of the speeding automobile has become for us a fact as soon as we
see it. But this fact may carry with it a new meaning. "What
does it mean" we may ask, "has he a right to speed at that rate
on a crowded street?" We may however drop the fact ana with it
its particular meaning, because we are in a hurry to get somewhere
and we cannot stop to bother with this fact. In the same manner
do we turn at corners. The corner controls us and has therefore
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a meaning., "but we do not stop to think of the meaning because it
is not problematic, we simply turn, aid as soon as we turn we may
forget the corner altogether. We say we turn at corners and dodge
automobiles instinctively, but as a matter of fact thi3 turning
and dodging is not instinct proper in its origin, as the instinct
of animals. Our mode of behavior, however, towards these objects,
especially when they do not constitute present purposes, is similar
to the instinctive behavior of animals. It is in the nature of
habit - a capacity to behave in an instinctive manner not inherited
but rather acquired through a repeated organization of conflicting
responses and elimination in a more or less large degree of the
problematic element.
The fact that an object may in the process of discrimina-
tion acquire different meanxings gives us a clue to the formation
of concepts. A concept is only a further development of discrim-
ination or meaning. We know from our experience that a variety of
meanings may De attributed to a single object, ana for the economy
of thought we bind them together under a single term. The dis-
tinction between conceptual knowledge and particular discrimination
is the distinction James made between "knowledge about" and "ac-
quaintance with". I have a concept of a house, which means that
I know about a house a number of things. The house may be here
or there, it may mean a kind of house that differs from many other
houses, or it may mean something particular in a house or differ-
ent from its parts. The various ways I have adjusted myself to
a house that came within the range of my experience I have ab-
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stracted ani symbolize them by the term "house", and am ready now
to consider them; I am ready to make a variety of ways of adjust-
ment. A concept then is an attitude of preparedness for a variety
of ways of adjustment. Now as to how I Trill actually adjust myself
after the preparedness takes place depends upon a particular con-
crete situation and not upon the concept. This does not mean that
I do not adjust myself to the concept; I do, but no as a concept,
but as a stimulus the response to which is preparedness, the sig-
nificant fact about this stimulus is that when it is related to an
actual environment it is capable of accomplishing a larger adjust-
ment. For example, I hear a speech in which the concepts, "blue?
"honesty", "house", "day", are made use of. Now ii I turn upon
these concepts as parts of experience, I do not find anything to
lay my finger on, that is, I do not find anything which constitutes
a house in itself, "houseness", so to speak, nor are there such
things as "blueness" or "honesty" as things in themselves. These
concepts, in other words, are not pure abstractions made up of men-
tal stuff. The question that arises now is, to what have we re-
sponded, if "blue", "honesty", "day", as concepts, are not the ob-
jects of experience? We certainly must have made a response to
something, otherwise it would not be an experience. All we can
say is that we respond here to certain sounds or words, and if these
words cannot be connected with the rest of experience thsy do not
mean very much. They do however acquire a rich meaning when they
are strategically connected with other situations. If, let us
say, soma one enters my room and calls out the word "honesty", with-
out reference to anything else, it is hard to tell what he means
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beyond a mere sound, but on the other hand, if I hear a speaker
talking about honesty connected with certain human activities, then
this concept means a great deal. A concept then is the bringing
in of a stimulus in a certain situation to be used as a tool, and
it becomes a very effective tool if it fits the situation. A
match when ignited by itself means only tha burning of a small
piece of wood, but when attached to a stick of dynamite it means
an explosion. The same is true of a stimulus used in a conceptual
manner; it is as important an instrument in a conscious or purpos-
ive relation as a machine in a mechanical relation.
We have spoken of a concept as being "knowledge about",
but it is knowledge about in so far as it can become "acquaintance
with", and there must have been a previous "acquaintance with" to
make possible a "knowledge about". The relation of "knowledge
about" to "acquaintance with" is the relation of fact to meaning,
-
the "knowledge about" standing for meaning and the "acquaintance
with" standing for fact. I say I have some knowledge "about" chem-
istry. I could not say I am "acquainted with" chemistry, because
chemistry is used here as a concept, a meaning. But in order that
this term chemistry should really have a significant meaning, I
must become "acquainted with" chemical substances. I afterwards
organize my various "acquaintances with" chemical substances and
symbolize them by one term "chemistry". Now as far as the sound
of the term chemistry goes, it has its own "acquaintance with" and
"knowledge about", which means a meaning and a fact. I becomes
however such a wondenul "knowledge about" because when used to
symbolize various "acquaintances with" it can carry out a variety
fl
35
of adjustments, it can further organize experience and as soon as it
does organize experience it becomes an "acquaintance with".

VI
THE MEANING OF PERSONALITY IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE
Our entire discussion has thus far revolved about a defi-
nite meaning, to wit - about a typical relation, a relation in which
the environment controls the organism with reference to an end. If
this is so, if consciousness is a relation, where is there any room
left for a "self" outside the body that is being controlled? Never-
theless the important fact about experience is that I feel. I think.
X_choose, that the I is always present in experience, that it per-
meates the very relations of the body to its environment. The cat -
egory of personality which expresses itself in such terms as "I",
"mine", or "roe" seems to give unity to our experience and yet if
we turn upon our experience we do not find the presence of the "I w
over and above the conscious relations. What then do we mean by
personality and where is it to be found?
Suppose that we take a concrete case where the category of
selfhood is present. If I say I see my house among many other
houses this object of my experience, namely my house, i3 here a
particular fact with particular meaning. The meaning is here indi-
cated by the term "my" which means that there is no subjective "I n
which has the experience, but the fact, the object which controls
my body reveals an "I" quality. It has a particular meaning which
means a particular function of control.
Some consideration of the distinction between fact and
meaning will perhaps throw more light on the issue. We have seen
before that the distinction between fact and meaning is a function-
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al distinction; the fact is a name for that which sets the problem,
while the meaning is a name for the way we solve the problem, for
the way we adjust ourselves to the fact. The meaning is a name for
the particular control the fact exercises when it enters in our cog-
nition as a particular fact. Now when I say I see my house among
many other houses, this house of mine is a particular fact where
the quality n I n is present. Here the other houses, so far as I am
conscious of them, have also meaning, either as objects which guide
me towards my house or simply as objects which are not to be noticed
any more; at any rate as soon as they turn into facts, as soon as
we have adjusted ourselves to them in such a way that they do not
offer any farther problems for adjustment, they cease to have mean-
ing ana in this manner also drop out from cognition as facts. We
do not pay any attention to them. An entire range of experience
may thus appear to be almost meaningless. We jump so to speak di-
rectly at the facts by leaping at an enormous speed from one to the
other in a sort of kinematographic fashion. However among all the
so-called meaningless experiences my house stands out distinctly,
both as a fact and as a meaning, because it still sets a problem,
it still controls me. My house gives a certain zest to my experi-
ence because it offers a purpose and this very purpose i3 precisely
the content or a phase of personality, since it is the purpose which
by adding certain things and eliminating other things as meaningful
factors in our conscious life gives unity to our experience. When
I speak of a thing as "mine", i simply mean that this thing one way
or another enters <®y purpose or system of purposes, although I
may at the moment not be directly acquainted with the thing I call
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"mine". I can speak of my. railroad in Australia, although I have
never seen that railroad; it is nevertheless "mine" because other
things which help realize my purpose can De traced back as depend-
ent on that railroad. I may speak of the Tsar of Russia as my
enemy, although we may r.ot know each other directly. I know how-
ever that our purpose© conilict; his purposes are against my pur-
pose which is the same as saying that he is against my self, my I;
he becomes mine - the negative "me" - my enemy.
It is evident that if one is to have a distinct personal-
ity he must ^o only have purpose, but his purpose should consti-
tute a unity. It is by the unity of purpose that we distinguish
personality, and the more coaprehensive purpose is, that is, the
more a number of lesser purposes are subjected to and cooperate wit*
a larger purpose, the more distinct and greater becomes the person-
ality. If, let us say, the comprehensive purposes of the same
man are in continual conflict then he becomes in a certain sense
his own enemy, - a dual personality. As Goethe says in Faust:
"Zwei Seelen wohnen, achj in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der andere trennen:"
because
"Die eine halt, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;
Die andre hebt gewaltsom sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen. n
Goethe's two conflicting souls is a name for the two con-
flicting attitudes toward the world; it is a conflict between two
uniform methods of adjustment, which means that there is a conflict
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in the world's control of the body, and hence a conflict of purposes.
That a unity of purpose, that a certain constancy of ad-
justment to the world, is what is meant by personality can be seen
from the fact that we somehow do fail to perceive personality where
there is a lack of regularity in behavior. We say that such a per-
son lacks character. He is tossed about on the waves of life with-
out any aim, without any purpose. You cannot tell what a person
like that is going to do next. On the other hand a man of whom
you can predict that he will behave in some certain way under given
conditions you speak of as a man of character or personality. It
is not that you know exactly how he will behave, but you do know
that he will take a definite attitude towards given conditions; you
know that he will take a definite stand, "he won't stand for it"
you are apt to say, or "he will do something about if, etc.; you
indicate that he has moral backbone. A man has personality and
intelligent personality if he can foresee distinctly the future pos-
sibilities of a situation and harmonize his world accordingly.
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